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Abstract
We establish a monotonicity principle for convex functions that enables high-level reasoning about capacity
in information theory. Despite its simplicity, this single idea is remarkably applicable. It leads to a sig-
niﬁcant extension of algebraic information theory, a solution of the capacity reduction problem, intuitive
graphical methods for comparing channels, new inequalities that provide useful estimates on the informa-
tion transmitting capability of a channel operating in an unknown environment, further explication of the
fascinating relationship between capacity and Euclidean distance, and the solution of an open problem in
quantum steganography.
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1 Introduction
A notion of particular interest in the ﬁeld of information theory is that of a channel.
A channel is a device that transforms symbols of an input alphabet X to symbols
of an output alphabet Y in a probabilistic way: when x ∈ X is the input, p(y|x)
gives the probability of getting y ∈ Y in the output. For such channels, capacity
is a measure of the maximum correlation between the input and the output. It is
0 when they are independent (all inputs produce the same output with the same
probability) and takes its maximum value when there are no transmission errors
(each output is produced by exactly one input). The importance of capacity rises
from Shannon’s theorem: capacity gives the maximum achievable rate at which
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we can transmit information using the channel, with arbitrarily low probability of
error.
Apart from their use in information theory, the notions of channel and capacity
have been proven quite useful in the area of security. It has been shown that in
many scenarios, systems or protocols can be fruitfully viewed as channels, and the
capacity of these channels can be regarded as a measure of the security guarantees of
the system. Techniques from information theory have been applied to a broad range
of security ﬁelds, including those of information ﬂow ([12,4]), quantum cryptography
([15]), anonymity ([13,3]) and trust ([14]).
However, an important drawback of capacity is its complexity. Despite its sim-
ple deﬁnition, there is no analytical formula that gives the capacity of a discrete
channel in the general case. It can be only computed approximately using numerical
algorithms such as the Arimoto-Blahut algorithm ([5]). And even in simple cases
where an analytical formula does exist, for example in the case of binary channels
having only two inputs and outputs, it is complicated and diﬃcult to use in practice.
For example, in many problems we need to be able to predict how a channel will
perform, but ﬁnd that its noise matrix varies with several parameters that depend
on random aspects of the environment which arise during the transmission. In such
cases we cannot compute the capacity of the channel, but we would still like to
obtain bounds on it or compare the performance of diﬀerent classes of channels.
The resulting formulae, however, make this goal very challenging.
It is thus natural to seek tools that allow high-level reasoning about capacity.
Developed in a recent line of work, algebraic information theory ([11]) oﬀers such
tools for binary channels. In that work, studying the relation of order, algebra and
topology, a domain of binary channels is considered and it is shown that capacity is
Scott-continuous, providing a tool to compare channels. Moreover, in [9] it is shown
that capacity is a measurement on this domain.
In this paper we exploit convexity, a property of capacity that has been in general
underused in the literature, but which turns out to be a fundamental property on
which a lot of results can be based. Convexity provides us with a monotonicity
principle that we use to give simpler and more general proofs of results from [11,9],
as well as numerous news ones, outlined in the next section.
Contribution
We establish a monotonicity principle for convex functions: a convex function
decreases on a line segment iﬀ it assumes its minimum value at the end of that
line segment. Though quite simple, this single idea has an unusual number of
important consequences for information theory and the areas which beneﬁt from it
(e.g. information hiding, security, quantum information).
The ﬁrst of these it that it oﬀers a signiﬁcant extension of algebraic information
theory: a new partial order is introduced on binary channels with respect to which
capacity is monotone. This new order is much larger than the interval order consid-
ered in [11], and can be characterized in at least three diﬀerent ways, each of which
has its own value: by means of a simple formula, which makes it easy to apply in
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practice; geometrically, which makes it easy to understand and reason about; and
algebraically, which establishes its canonical nature, mathematically speaking.
These results provide graphical methods for reasoning about the capacity of
channels, which are of value to practitioners in information theory and security.
The mathematics of information theory often prevent reviewers of high assurance
devices from using it. The graphical methods we introduce avoid this problem.
There is a ‘geometry of binary channels’, in which, roughly speaking, a line of
channels either hits the diagonal, or is parallel to it. We determine the behavior of
capacity in both these cases, which allows one to answer most (but not all) questions
when it comes to comparing channel behavior.
Another use of the monotonicity principle is in establishing inequalities relat-
ing diﬀerent measurements on the domain of channels. These inequalities have
several uses. As already explained, the channel matrix often depends on external
parameters. While determining these parameters precisely in advance is usually not
possible, one can surprisingly often obtain useful bounds on them. Thus, we need
methods for estimating the capacity of a channel given only partial information
about its noise matrix. Speciﬁcally, methods that provide estimates of capacity
from estimates of a channel’s noise matrix which themselves are derived from es-
timates of underlying experimental parameters. Our inequalities provide exactly
these kinds of methods.
As a case in point, we derive a lower bound on the capacity of a hidden channel
within quantum key distribution in the presence of noise. Previously, a bound was
known ([8]) only for the case where the noise is due solely to eavesedropping, in
which the noise matrix has a simple symmetric form. We establish a fundamental
theoretical limit of 1−H(1/4) ≈ 0.18 for the case of arbitrary noise caused by any
combination of eavesdropping and/or environment. Our results also make it clear
that there is a best way to interrupt this hidden communication, and they even tell
us what this way is.
Note that, even though most of these results are limited to binary channels, the
monotonicity principle itself holds in general.
The proofs of all results can be found in the report version of this paper ([2]).
2 Channels
Nearly all the results in this paper concern binary channels, so we devote the ma-
jority of this section to discussing their speciﬁcs. A binary channel has two inputs
(“0” and “1”) and two outputs (“0” and “1”). An input is sent through the channel
to a receiver. Because of noise in the channel, what arrives may not necessarily be
what the sender intended. The eﬀect of noise on input data is modeled by a noise
matrix u. If data is sent through the channel according to the distribution x, then
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the output is distributed as y = x · u. The noise matrix u is given by
u =
⎛
⎝a a¯
b b¯
⎞
⎠
where a = P (0|0) is the probability of receiving 0 when 0 is sent and b = P (0|1) is
the probability of receiving 0 when 1 is sent and x¯ := 1− x for x ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, the noise matrix of a binary channel can be represented by a point (a, b)
in the unit square [0, 1]2 and all points in the unit square represent the noise matrix
of some binary channel.
The composition of two binary channels x and y is the channel whose noise
matrix is the usual product of matrices x · y = xy. The multiplication of two noise
matrices x = (a, b) and y = (c, d) in the unit square representation is
(a, b) · (c, d) = ( a(c− d) + d, b(c− d) + d ) = c(a, b) + d(a¯, b¯)
where the expression to the right uses scalar multiplication and addition of vectors.
By contrast, the representation for the sum of noise matrices is simply the sum of
each representing vector. 3
A monoid is a set with an associative binary operation that has an identity. The
set of binary channels is a monoid under the operation of multiplication whose iden-
tity is the noiseless channel 1 := (1, 0). A binary channel can be classiﬁed according
to the sign of its determinant, det(a, b) = a − b, which deﬁnes a homomorphism
det : ([0, 1]2, ·)→ ([−1, 1], ·) between monoids.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A binary channel x is called positive when det(x) > 0, negative
when det(x) < 0 and a zero channel when det(x) = 0. A channel is nonnegative if
it is either positive or zero.
Notice that det(x) ∈ (0, 1] for positive channels, and that det(x) ∈ [−1, 0) for
negative channels. Thus, the set of positive channels is a submonoid of [0, 1]2 as
is the set of nonnegative channels; the determinant is a homomorphism from the
nonnegative channels into ([0, 1], ·).
Notation 2.2 The set of nonnegative binary channels is denoted N. The set of
positive binary channels is denoted P.
A nice property of positive channels is that composition can be inverted (even
though the “inverse” of a channel is not a channel).
Lemma 2.3 For a ∈ P, x, y ∈ N we have ax = ay iﬀ x = y iﬀ xa = ya.
The amount of information that may be sent through a channel (a, b) is given
3 More speciﬁcally we mean the convex sum tM1 + t¯M2, t ∈ [0, 1] of noise matrices M1,M2 which itself is
a noise matrix
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by its capacity:
c(a, b) = log2
(
2
a¯H(b)−b¯H(a)
a−b + 2
bH(a)−aH(b)
a−b
)
where H(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the base two entropy. Capacity is
continuous on the unit square ([9]).
The general case: (m,n) channels.
In the general case, we have m inputs and n outputs, so the noise matrix u has
m rows and n columns, each entry is a probability, and as before, each row sums to
one. Noise matrices for (m,n) channels are closed under ﬁnite convex sums, but are
only closed under composition when the associated matrix multiplication is deﬁned.
If we write the noise matrix u of a channel as a list of rows u = (u1, . . . , um) and
p is a distribution over the channel’s inputs, then the mutual information between
the input and output of channel is
Ip(u) = H(p · u)−
m∑
i=1
piH(ui).
The capacity of the channel u is then c(u) = supp Ip(u).
3 The monotonicity principle
We will denote 1− t by t. A subset S of a vector space is convex iﬀ tx1 + tx2 ∈ S
for all x1, x2 ∈ S, t ∈ [0, 1]. A function f : S → R is convex iﬀ
tf(x1) + tf(x2) ≥ f(tx1 + tx2) ∀x1, x2 ∈ S, ∀t ∈ [0, 1]
A function f is strictly convex if the equality (in the above inequality) holds iﬀ
x1 = x2 or t ∈ {0, 1}. We now come to the monotonicity principle: a convex
function decreases along a line segment iﬀ it assumes its minimum value at the end
of that line segment.
Theorem 3.1 If S is a set of vectors, x, y ∈ S, π(t) = ty + t¯x is the line from x
to y and c : S → R is a function (strictly) convex on π[0, 1], then the following are
equivalent:
(i) The function c ◦ π : [0, 1] → R is (strictly) monotone decreasing,
(ii) The minimum value of c ◦ π on [0, 1] is c(π(1)) = c(y).
It is by no means obvious that the monotonicity principle is of any value in
problem solving. However, as we will see shortly, there are many situations in
information theory where it is far easier to establish a minimum value along a line
than it is to establish monotonicity itself.
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It is well-known ([5]) that mutual information Ip is a convex function of u for a
ﬁxed p. An important consequence of this, ﬁrst observed by Shannon ([16]), though
not particularly well-known, is that capacity itself is convex:
Theorem 3.2 Capacity c(u) is a convex function of u.
In the case of binary channels we make the previous result more precise by
showing that the capacity is strictly convex everywhere, except on the zero channels.
Theorem 3.3 The capacity on binary channels is strictly convex everywhere except
on the zero channels. That is, given u1, u2 ∈ [0, 1]2, u1 = u2 and t ∈ (0, 1), we have
c(tu1 + t¯u2) ≤ tc(u1) + t¯c(u2), with equality if and only if both u1, u2 are zero
channels.
Because Theorem 3.1 can be applied to any line that ends on a minimum capacity
channel, it provides a powerful technique for comparing the capacity of channels.
One immediate application of it is that we can solve the capacity reduction problem
for arbitrary (m,n) channels. In the capacity reduction problem, we have an (m,n)
channel x and would like to systematically obtain a channel whose capacity is smaller
by some speciﬁed amount. The monotonicity principle oﬀers a solution:
Proposition 3.4 Let x be any (m,n) channel, y be any (m,n) channel with zero
capacity and π denote the line from x to y. Then c(π[0, 1]) = [0, c(x)] and the
function c ◦ π is monotone decreasing.
Thus, given any 0 < r < c(x), we need only solve the equation c(π(t)) = r for t.
This equation can be solved numerically since c◦π−r changes sign on [0, 1]. Notice
that this enables us to systematically solve a problem that otherwise would have
m(n − 1) unknowns but only a single equation. Moreover, the channel obtained is
a linear degradation of the original. Similarly, we can systematically increase the
capacity using the line from x to a maximum capacity channel. We now turn to
another use of the monotonicity principle.
4 Relations between channels
In this section, we consider partial orders on binary channels with respect to which
capacity is monotone. Their importance stems from the fact that a statement like
“x ≤ y” is much easier to verify than a statement like “c(x) ≤ c(y)”. In situations
where the noise matrix of a channel is only partially speciﬁed, by means of bounds
on experimental parameters for instance, or where it is known but varies with a
parameter like time or the probability of losing a photon [9], their usefulness is
especially apparent.
4.1 Algebraic information theory
Algebraic information theory uses the interplay of order, algebra and topology to
study communication.
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Deﬁnition 4.1 The interval domain is the set of nonnegative binary channels
(N,
) together with the relation 
 deﬁned by x 
 y iﬀ b ≤ d and c ≤ a, for
x = (a, b), y = (c, d) ∈ N. The natural measurement μ : N→ [0, 1]∗ is given by
μx = det(x) = a− b x ∈ N
This is not the usual notation in domain theory for the interval domain, but
experience has taught us that this is the simplest way of handling things in the
context of information theory. The following result is proven in [11]:
Theorem 4.2 Let (N, ·) denote the monoid of nonnegative channels. The right
zero elements of N are precisely the zero channels. The maximally commutative
submonoids of N are precisely the lines which join the identity to a zero channel.
For any maximally commutative submonoid π ⊆ N:
(∀x, y ∈ π) x 
 y ⇔ μx ≥ μy ⇔ cx ≥ cy
Capacity on N is monotone: x 
 y ⇒ c(x) ≥ c(y).
We will now see that the monotonicity principle oﬀers a new order ≤ on channels
that leads to a clear and signiﬁcant extension of algebraic information theory.
4.2 A new partial order on binary channels
By the monotonicity principle, capacity decreases along any line that ends on a zero
capacity channel. This suggests a new way of ordering positive channels:
Deﬁnition 4.3 Let x = (a, b) and y = (c, d) ∈ P,
x ≤ y ≡ c · μx ≥ a · μy and c¯ · μx ≥ a¯ · μy
Recall that a partial order on a set is a relation which is reﬂexive, transitive and
antisymmetric.
Proposition 4.4
(i) The relation ≤ is a partial order on the set P of positive channels,
(ii) For x, y ∈ P, if x 
 y, then x ≤ y. In particular, the least element of (P,≤) is
the identity channel ⊥ = (1, 0),
(iii) For x, y ∈ P, we have x ≤ y iﬀ there is a line segment that begins at x, passes
through y and ends at some point of {(t, t) : t ∈ [0, 1]},
(iv) Capacity c : P → [0, 1]∗ is strictly monotone: if x ≤ y, then c(x) ≥ c(y) with
equality iﬀ x = y.
Notice that the monotonicity of capacity on (N,
), given in Theorem 4.2, is now
a trivial consequence of (ii) and (iv) in Proposition 4.4, showing also that capacity
is strictly monotone wrt 
.
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Fig. 1. Geometric representation of ,≤.
4.3 The coincidence of algebra, order and geometry
Each order is given by a simple formula (Deﬁnitions 4.1 and 4.3) that is easy to
verify in practice. Each also has a clear geometric signiﬁcance which makes it easy
to reason about: for x = (a, b) ∈ P and y ∈ P,
• x 
 y iﬀ y is contained in the triangle with vertices {(a, a), x, (b, b)} iﬀ there is a
line segment from x to a point of {(t, t) : t ∈ [b, a]} that passes through y.
• x ≤ y iﬀ y is contained in the triangle with vertices {(0, 0), x, (1, 1)} iﬀ there is a
line segment from x to a point of {(t, t) : t ∈ [0, 1]} that passes through y.
A geometric interpretation of these orders is shown in Figure 1. Remarkably, each
of these orders can also be characterized algebraically:
Lemma 4.5 For x, y ∈ P,
(i) x 
 y iﬀ (∃z ∈ P) zx = y,
(ii) x ≤ y iﬀ (∃z ∈ P)xz = y.
Thus, despite the somewhat awkward formulation of ≤ given in Deﬁnition 4.3,
we see that ≤ is nevertheless quite natural. In fact, from the point of view of
information theory, it is more natural than 
:
Theorem 4.6 Let (P, ·, 1) denote the monoid of positive binary channels.
(i) The relation x ≤ y ≡ (∃z ∈ P)xz = y deﬁnes a partial order on P with respect to
which capacity c : P→ [0, 1]∗ is strictly monotone,
(ii) For all a, x ∈ P there exists y ∈ P s.t. xa = ay,
(iii) The operator lx : P→ P :: lx(y) = xy is monotone with respect to ≤,
(iv) The operator rx : P→ P :: rx(y) = yx is monotone with respect to ≤.
By contrast, rx is monotone with respect to 
, but lx is not. The reason for
this diﬀerence is that P ·x ⊆ x ·P holds for all x ∈ P, and this inclusion is strict. So
even though P is not commutative, it has a special property commutative monoids
have which ensures that both lx and rx are monotone with respect to ≤. The
monotonicity of lx and rx implies that
(∀ a, b, x, y ∈ P)x ≤ y ⇒ c(axb) ≥ c(ayb)
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with equality iﬀ x = y since axb ≤ ayb and c(axb) = c(ayb) implies axb = ayb
which from Lemma 2.3 implies that x = y. The above inequality, in turn, has an
important and new consequence for information theory:
Corollary 4.7 For all a, b, x, y ∈ P,
c(axyb) ≤ min{c(axb), c(ayb)}
with equality iﬀ x = 1 or y = 1.
In particular, for a = b = 1, the well-known inequality c(xy) ≤ min{c(x), c(y)}
follows. It is interesting indeed that it may be derived from an order which itself
may be derived from algebraic structure. This illustrates the value of knowing about
the coincidence of algebra, order and geometry.
5 Relations between monotone mappings on channels
Having just considered relations between binary channels, we now turn to rela-
tions between monotone mappings on binary channels. Of particular interest is the
fascinating relationship between capacity and Euclidean distance.
5.1 Algebraic relations
Both capacity and Euclidean distance are invariant under multiplication by the
idempotent e = (0, 1):
Lemma 5.1 Let e := (0, 1). For any x = (a, b) ∈ [0, 1]2,
(i) e · (a, b) = (b, a) & (a, b) · e = (a¯, b¯)
(ii) c(ex) = c(xe) = c(x)
(iii) | det(ex)| = | det(xe)| = | det(x)|
We now establish our ﬁrst result which relates capacity to distance:
Theorem 5.2 For two binary channels x, y ∈ [0, 1]2,
c(xy) ≤ min{ c(x)|det(y)|, |det(x)|c(y) }.
with equality iﬀ x (or y) is 1, e or a zero channel.
The last result extends to any convex function on N. It gives a new proof of a
well-known result in information theory,
Corollary 5.3 For x, y ∈ [0, 1]2, c(xy) ≤ min{c(x), c(y)} with equality iﬀ x (or y)
is 1, e or a zero channel.
and also sheds light on the relation between Euclidean distance and capacity:
Corollary 5.4 For a binary channel x ∈ [0, 1]2, c(x) ≤ |det(x)| with equality iﬀ x
is 1, e or a zero channel.
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Intuitively, the Euclidean distance |det | is a canonical upper bound on capacity.
Our goal now is to prove this. First, |det | is determined by its value on the set N of
nonnegative channels. Next, as a function on N, it preserves multiplication, convex
sum and identity. There are only two functions like this in existence:
Theorem 5.5 If f : N→ [0, 1] is a function such that
• f(1) = 1
• f(xy) = f(x)f(y)
• f(px + p¯y) = pf(x) + p¯f(y)
then either f ≡ 1 or f = det.
Thus, there is only one nontrivial convex-linear homomorphism above capacity:
the determinant. This raises the question of how close in value the two are.
5.2 Inequalities
In the formulation of ≤ given in Deﬁnition 4.3, the case μx = μy is speciﬁcally
excluded i.e. channels that lie on a line of constant determinant do not compare with
respect to ≤ unless they are equal. The behavior of capacity on such lines is more
involved than it is for lines that hit the diagonal. We now turn to this important
special case, and once again, ﬁnd the monotonicity principle indispensable.
Consider a line in N of ﬁxed determinant, that is, a line joining the Z-channels
(d, 0) and (1, 1− d):
πd(t) = t(1, 1− d) + t¯(d, 0)
Let c(t) denote the capacity of the channel πd(t).
Theorem 5.6 The function c ◦ πd for d > 0 is strictly monotonically decreasing
on [0, 12 ] and strictly monotonically increasing on [
1
2 , 1]. For d = 0, it is identically
zero.
We have derived the following lower and upper bounds on the capacity:
Corollary 5.7 For any binary channel x ∈ [0, 1]2,
1−H
(
1− |det(x)|
2
)
≤ c(x) ≤ log2
(
1 + 2
−H(| det(x)|)
| det(x)|
)
with the understanding that the expression on the right is zero when det(x) = 0.
The bounds in Corollary 5.7 are canonical:
Deﬁnition 5.8 A function f : [0, 1]2 → R is called det-invariant if | det(x)| = |det(y)|
implies f(x) = f(y) for all x, y ∈ N.
Thus, a det-invariant function is one whose value depends only on the magnitude
of the channel’s determinant – in particular, such functions are symmetric.
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Corollary 5.9 The supremum a(x) and inﬁmum b(x) of all det-invariant lower
bounds on capacity are equal to
a(x) = 1−H
(
1− |det(x)|
2
)
b(x) = log2
(
1 + 2
−H(| det(x)|)
| det(x)|
)
The best det-invariant lower bound in Corollary 5.7 is the key idea in determining
how close in value |det | is to c:
Theorem 5.10
sup
(a,b)∈[0,1]2
|det(a, b)| − c(a, b) = log2(5/4)
which is attained by the channels (4/5, 1/5), (1/5, 4/5).
The number log2(5/4) is approximately equal to 0.3219. Because |det | itself is
a det-invariant upper bound on capacity, b(x) ≤ |det(x)| by Corollary 5.9, and we
have the following chain of inequalities:
a(x) ≤ c(x) ≤ b(x) ≤ |det(x)| ≤ c(x) + log2
(
5
4
)
Results like these can be applied to the diﬃcult problem of bounding the capacity of
a timing channel: a channel where each output symbol has an associated cost ti > 0
and one seeks to determine capacity per unit time or put simply, timed capacity. In
this problem, bounds are especially useful because there are no formulae available
for computing timed capacity – even in the case of a noiseless binary timing channel,
one must resort to numerical methods [10]. However, any lower and upper bound
on capacity c leads to one on timed capacity ct because
c
max ti
≤ ct ≤ cmin ti
so we obtain a bound on the capacity of a binary timing channel that in some cases
may be quite useful.
5.3 A topological relation
Earlier we studied partial orders on binary channels, each oﬀers a diﬀerent way of
relating a pair of channels to one another. We then jumped up a level of abstrac-
tion and studied relations that exist between fundamental monotone mappings on
binary channels. However, the partial orders are not merely partial orders, and the
monotone mappings are not merely monotone. In each case, more mathematical
structure is present, and by taking this additional structure into account, a new
relation between capacity and distance emerges. This one is topological.
The extra structure that the poset N has is that it is a domain: a partially
ordered set with intrinsic notions of completeness and approximation deﬁned by
the order. The extra structure that capacity has is that it is a measurement: a
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function μ that to each informative object x assigns a number μx which measures
the information content of the object x. We now deﬁne each of these terms precisely
before discussing them further.
The intrinsic notion of completeness that a domain has is that it forms a dcpo:
Deﬁnition 5.11 Let (P,
) be a partially ordered set or poset. A nonempty subset
S ⊆ P is directed if (∀x, y ∈ S)(∃z ∈ S)x, y 
 z. The supremum ⊔S of S ⊆ P
is the least of its upper bounds when it exists. A dcpo is a poset in which every
directed set has a supremum.
The intrinsic notion of approximation possessed by a domain is formalized by
continuity:
Deﬁnition 5.12 Let (D,
) be a dcpo. For elements x, y ∈ D, we write x  y iﬀ
for every directed subset S with y 
 ⊔S, we have x 
 s, for some s ∈ S. We set
↓↓x := {y ∈ D : y  x} and ↑↑x := {y ∈ D : x  y}
and say D is continuous if ↓↓x is directed with supremum x for each x ∈ D.
Deﬁnition 5.13 A domain is a continuous dcpo.
The poset of nonnegative channels N is order isomorphic to the compact subin-
tervals of the unit interval
I[0, 1] = {[a, b] : a, b ∈ [0, 1] & a ≤ b}
ordered by reverse inclusion with an explicit isomorphism given by N → I[0, 1] ::
(a, b) → [b, a]. This correspondence implies that N forms a domain, called the
interval domain, where
⊔
S =
⋂
S, for directed S ⊆ I[0, 1] and x  y iﬀ y ⊆ int(x).
Notice that int(x) refers to the interior of the interval x in its relative Euclidean
topology.
Deﬁnition 5.14 The Scott topology on a continuous dcpo D has as a basis all sets
of the form ↑↑x for x ∈ D.
A function f : D → E between domains is Scott continuous if the inverse image
of a Scott open set in E is Scott open in D. Let [0,∞)∗ denote the poset of
nonnegative reals in their dual order: x 
 y ≡ y ≤ x.
Deﬁnition 5.15 A Scott continuous μ : D → [0,∞)∗ is said to measure the content
of x ∈ D if for all Scott open sets U ⊆ D,
x ∈ U ⇒ (∃ε > 0)x ∈ με(x) ⊆ U
where με(x) := {y ∈ D : y 
 x & |μx− μy| < ε}.
Deﬁnition 5.16 A measurement μ : D → [0,∞)∗ is a Scott continuous map that
measures the content of ker(μ) := {x ∈ D : μx = 0}.
K. Chatzikokolakis, K. Martin / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 218 (2008) 111–129122
The order on a domain D deﬁnes a clear sense in which one object has ‘more
information’ than another: a qualitative view of information content. The deﬁnition
of measurement attempts to identify those monotone mappings μ which oﬀer a
quantitative measure of information content in the sense speciﬁed by the order.
The essential point in the deﬁnition of measurement is that μ measure content in
a manner that is consistent with the particular view oﬀered by the order. There
are plenty of monotone mappings that are not measurements – and while some of
them may measure information content in some other sense, each sense must ﬁrst
be speciﬁed by a diﬀerent information order. The deﬁnition of measurement is then
a minimal test that a function μ must pass if we are to regard it as providing a
measure of information content.
We now consider a few properties that measures of information content have
which arbitrary monotone mappings in general need not have: qualities that make
them ‘diﬀerent’ from maps that are simply monotone. Other such properties may
be found in [7]. Deﬁne d : D2 → [0,∞)∗ by
d(x, y) = inf{μz : z 
 x, y}
where we assume that D has either a least element or more generally is ‘ﬁltered’.
Denote the ε balls with respect to d by Bε(x) := {y ∈ D : d(x, y) < ε}.
Theorem 5.17 (Martin[7]) Let μ : D → [0,∞)∗ be a measurement.
(i) x ∈ ker(μ)⇒ x ∈ max(D) = {x ∈ D : ↑x = {x}}.
(ii) If μ measures the content of y ∈ D, then
(∀x ∈ D) x 
 y & μx = μy ⇒ x = y.
(iii) If μ measures X ⊆ D, then {Bε(x) ∩X : x ∈ X, ε > 0} is a basis for the Scott
topology on X.
Theorem 5.17 says that any measurement on N induces the Euclidean topology
on its kernel.
Theorem 5.18 (Martin[9]) Capacity c : N→ [0, 1]∗ is a measurement.
In the case of capacity c : N → [0, 1]∗, the associated distance function on
ker(c) = max(N) works out to be ρ([a], [b]) = c(a, b) = c(b, a). Then, just like
Euclidean distance, capacity also has the following three properties: (i) c(a, b) =
c(b, a), (ii) c(a, b) = 0 iﬀ a = b, (iii) the sets {y ∈ [0, 1] : c(x, y) < ε} for ε > 0 form
a basis for the Euclidean topology on [0, 1].
Capacity does not satisfy the triangle inequality, so it is not a priori obvious
that the sets in (iii) form a basis for any topology, let alone the Euclidean topology.
Thus, this is another relationship between capacity and the determinant: each of
them is a measure of distance that induces the Euclidean topology. What we now
seek is a better understanding of why this happens. For this, we need to think about
how this result is proved.
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The proof that capacity is a measurement given in [9] depends on the result
of Majani and Rumsey [6], and is interesting since it connects the study of mea-
surement in domain theory to a fundamental and beautiful result in information
theory. Speciﬁcally, it is shown that c(a, b) ≥ (det(a, b))2/(e2 ln(2)). This lower
bound has the form ν ◦ det where ν : [0, 1] → [0, 1/(e2 ln(2))] is the order isomor-
phism ν(t) = t2/(e2 ln(2)). The proof in [9] relies heavily on speciﬁc results only
known to hold for binary channels as well as intricate arguments from analysis. We
now give a new proof of this result which has several advantages over the one in [9].
Proposition 5.19 Let ϕ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be the function ϕ(t) = 1−H((1− t)/2). If
λ : N → [0,∞)∗ is Scott continuous and λ ≥ ϕ ◦ det, then λ is a measurement. In
particular, capacity is a measurement.
In fact, every function in the string of inequalities
1−H
(
1−| det(x)|
2
)
≤ c(x) ≤ log2
(
1 + 2
−H(| det(x)|)
| det(x)|
)
is a measurement and has properties (i), (ii) and (iii) discussed earlier. This new
proof is an improvement over the one in [9]:
• ϕ ◦ det is a better lower bound than ν ◦ det: by Corollary 5.9, ν ◦ det ≤ ϕ ◦ det,
• The inequality ϕ◦det ≤ c is derived using only the monotonicity principle, a fact
known to hold for arbitrary channels.
Moreover, the measurement ϕ ◦ det has profound applied signiﬁcance, as we now
demonstrate by using it to solve an open problem in quantum steganography.
6 Quantum steganography
In this section, we will learn a few of the fascinating implications the results in this
paper have within the realm of communication. We ﬁrst review the basic protocol
for quantum key distribution. Because we intend for this paper to be readable
by someone with no prior knowledge of quantum mechanics, we discuss only the
minimal background needed to understand quantum key distribution. The few ideas
we make use of are very simple.
6.1 Quantum information
Like all systems, a quantum system has state. The state of a quantum system is
represented by a unit vector in a vector space that has a lot more structure than
most, known as a Hilbert space. The state of a quantum system is also called a
ket. Here are two examples of kets: |0〉 and |1〉. It is useful to think about these
two particular kets as being quantum realizations of the classical bits 0 and 1. Each
refers to a legitimate state of a quantum system. A photon is an example of a
quantum system and its polarization (state) is something we need kets to describe.
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One of the neat things about a quantum system is that it can also be in any
state ‘in between’ |0〉 and |1〉, such as |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) or |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉),
which we also think of as representing the classical bits 1 and 0 respectively. Any
ket |ψ〉 that can be written as |ψ〉 = a|0〉+ b|1〉, for |a|2 + |b|2 = 1, is called a qubit.
There are only four qubits that we care about in this paper: |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 and |−〉.
Like all systems, one would like to extract information from a quantum system.
One way to extract information from a quantum system is to perform a measurement
on it. Before an observer can perform a measurement on a quantum system, they
must say what they want to measure. One way an observer can specify what they
want to measure is by specifying a basis and then “performing a measurement in
the speciﬁed basis.” Two examples of bases are X = {|+〉, |−〉} and Z = {|0〉, |1〉}.
They are the only bases we will use in this paper 4 . What happens when we measure
a quantum system?
If the state of a quantum system is described by the qubit |ψ〉 = a|0〉+b|1〉, then
a measurement in the Z basis will yield the result |0〉 with probability |a|2 and the
result |1〉 with probability |b|2. Notice that these are the only possible outcomes of
this measurement because qubits satisfy |a|2+|b|2 = 1, a property they have because
they are unit vectors. In this paper, we only care about measuring the following
four states in the Z basis: |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 and |−〉. If we measure a system with state
|0〉 in the Z basis, we get |0〉 with probability 1; the same is true of the state |1〉.
If we measure either |+〉 or |−〉 in the Z basis, we obtain |0〉 with probability 1/2
and |1〉 with probability 1/2.
It is also possible to measure a system in the X basis. If a system is in the state
|+〉 and we measure it in the X basis, we get |+〉 with probability 1, similarly for
|−〉. But what happens when we measure a system with state |0〉 or |1〉 in the X
basis? Well, ﬁrst we have to express these states as sums of states in the X basis:
|0〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉+ |−〉) |1〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉 − |−〉)
Now we can see that if we measure |0〉 in the X basis, we get |+〉 with probability
1/2 and |−〉 with probability 1/2, similarly for |1〉.
6.2 Quantum key distribution
We now recall one of the standard accounts of quantum key distribution (QKD), the
BB84 protocol [15]: (1) Alice chooses a random string k of about 4n bits containing
the eventual key. (2) Alice randomly codes each bit of k in either the X = {|+〉, |−〉}
or Z = {|0〉, |1〉} bases. (3) Alice sends each resulting qubit to Bob. (4) Bob receives
the 4n qubits, randomly measuring each in either the X or the Z basis. (5) Alice
announces in which basis she originally coded each bit of k. (6) Bob tells Alice which
bits he received correctly; they now share about 2n bits. (7) Alice selects a subset
of n bits from the group she formed in step (6) that will be used. to check on Eve’s
4 Many bases are possible, and each oﬀers a diﬀerent way of representing the classical bits 0 and 1. The
ability to alternate between such representations helps prevent eavesdropping in QKD.
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interference, and tells Bob which bits she selected. (8) Alice and Bob compare their
values of the n check bits; if more than an acceptable number disagree, they abort
the protocol (eavesdropping). (9) Alice and Bob perform information reconciliation
and privacy ampliﬁcation to select a smaller m-bit key from the remaining n bits.
The bits in step (6) are called the sifted bits. If Alice has coded a classical bit in
either of the X or Z bases, and later Bob measures in the same basis, he will receive
the bit sent by Alice with probability 1. Such a bit will be one of the sifted bits.
But now suppose that an eavesdropper wishes to know the bit Alice is sending Bob.
Well the eavesdropper, named Eve, has to guess which basis Alice coded the bit in,
and then measure it herself. When Eve guesses, she introduces an error into the
sifted bits with probability 1/4 – but an error that Alice and Bob will know about,
and this is the reason they are able to detect the presence of an eavesdropper.
It is fundamental in QKD that Alice and Bob insist on an error rate within
the sifted bits that is less than 1/4 to defend themselves from precisely this type of
attack, or else the security of QKD cannot be guaranteed [1]. For instance, assuming
errors only due to Eve, if Eve has measured all the qubits sent from Alice to Bob,
then Eve knows which of the sifted bits Bob and Alice share, and which of the sifted
bits they may not share 5 . This is something that Bob himself does not even know.
With an error rate beyond 1/4, Bob cannot have more information than Eve about
any key generated – remember that after the sifted bits are identiﬁed, Eve can listen
in on the rest of the protocol, since it takes place over a public channel.
6.3 Analysis of hidden channels within quantum key distribution
As explained in [8], QKD is not communication, for the simple fact that neither Alice
nor Bob has any control over the sifted bits, or the key their interaction ultimately
produces. However, as ﬁrst shown in [8], it can be modiﬁed so that communication
is possible: a quantum protocol can be used to obtain a new protocol which is
physically indistinguishable from the original, but which also contains a channel
whose existence is undetectable by any currently known technology. The potential
of such ‘hidden channels’ is discussed in [8].
Let us give a simple illustration of how such hidden channels arise. Assume Alice
would like to send Bob a single bit of information. All we have to do is make a
simple change to step (7) in QKD: “(7) Alice randomly selects a bit from the group
of 2n whose value is the information she wants to transmit. Then she randomly
selects n − 1 check bits from the remaining 2n − 1. The nth check bit is chosen
from the remaining n+1 as being the bit to the immediate left of the information.”
Bob now has the information Alice sent: he knows its relation to the last check bit,
because the two parties have agreed on this scheme in advance. They have agreed
that Alice will covertly send Bob a ‘pointer’ to the information.
Here is an example: Alice and Bob share the 2n bits, Alice selects the information
bit
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
5 Eve knows when she guessed the right basis and when she did not.
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Now she selects n− 1 check bits at random, which leaves Alice and Bob with n+ 1
remaining bits
0 ∗ 1 0 ∗ 0 1 ∗ 1 ∗ 0 ∗ 0 ∗ 0 ∗ ∗ 1 ∗ 1 0 ∗ 1 ∗ 1 1 ∗ ∗
Alice now selects the last check bit as being the pointer to the information i.e. the
bit to the immediate left of the information bit:
0 ∗ 1 0 ∗ 0 1 ∗ 1 ∗ 0 ∗ 0 ∗ −→0 ∗ ∗ 1 ∗ 1 0 ∗ 1 ∗ 1 1 ∗ ∗
Is Bob guaranteed to receive the information sent by Alice? No. There are many
reasons why. Suppose an eavesdropper just happens to measure only the qubit that
holds the information in the wrong basis, then there is a 50 percent chance that Bob
has the wrong bit, even though he believes he has the right bit. Or suppose that
background light acts as noise which causes the information bit to ﬂip. In either
case, Bob would have no idea, and neither would Alice. But chances are good that
such errors, whether caused by the environment or an eavesdropper, would also
manifest themselves in the check bits as well, which would then enable them to
estimate the likelihood that their attempt to communicate will succeed. Alice and
Bob always have the option of aborting the protocol if their chances of success are
not deemed high enough. The question we want to answer is: what is the capacity
of this channel?
Theorem 6.1 (Martin [8]) If the error rate α ∈ [0, 1/4) is due solely to inter-
ference caused by Eve, then the capacity of the Alice-Bob steganographic channel is
1−H(α). In particular, the capacity of the Alice-Bob channel is never smaller than
1−H(1/4) ≈ 0.1887.
It is important to understand in the last result that the phrase “interference
caused by Eve” means not only that Eve causes all errors, but that she causes these
errors by essentially performing random combinations of X and Z measurements.
This point is fundamental, since it implies that the probability of a 0 ﬂipping to a 1
is the same as the probability that a 1 ﬂips to a 0. The reason is that Eve cannot tell
which classical bit a qubit represents before she performs a measurement and that
Alice sends bits with equal frequency. This means the hidden channel is binary
symmetric where the probability of a ﬂip is α: the noise matrix of the hidden
channel is (α¯, α), so its capacity is 1−H(α). Moreover, because the parameter α is
an experimentally determined quantity that must be calculated in any realization
of QKD to check for the presence of an eavesdropper, the last result allows us to
calculate the capacity of any hidden channel based on sifted bits any time that a
QKD experiment is performed [8].
But now suppose Eve does something other than perform measurements in the
X and Z bases at random. Or suppose some of the noise is caused by the en-
vironment. Then it is no longer necessarily the case that 1 and 0 ﬂip with the
same probability, so whatever the noise matrix of the hidden channel is, we know
that it is not necessarily binary symmetric. For instance, a well-known eﬀect like
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amplitude damping [15] does not aﬀect |0〉 but does ﬂip |1〉. Thus, in the case of
general noise, the matrix for the channel is unknown, in the sense that it cannot be
determined from experimentally necessary quantities. We can nevertheless establish
the following important lower bound on its capacity:
Theorem 6.2 Let the error rate be α ∈ [0, 1/4). Then the capacity of the Alice-
Bob steganographic channel is at least 1 −H(α). In particular, the capacity of the
Alice-Bob channel is never smaller than 1−H(1/4) ≈ 0.1887.
The principle underlying this last result is clear as well as surprising: from
the point of view of Alice and Bob, noise caused by an arbitrary combination of
environment and eavesdropper is preferable to noise caused by an eavesdropper
alone. The reason is that an eavesdropper causes bits to ﬂip with equal probability,
leading to a binary symmetric channel, whereas the environment may not.
Put another way, any attempt to interrupt the hidden channel should necessarily
employ a random combination of X and Z measurements. Even for error rates α
arbitrarily close to 1/4, any scheme that does not ﬂip bits with equal probability will
permit a capacity higher than the theoretical limit of 1−H(1/4), up to a possible
maximum of c(1, 1/2) = log2(5/4) ≈ 0.32.
As these results make clear, det-invariant bounds on capacity provide a valuable
way to approximate the capacity of a channel when its determinant is known, but its
noise matrix is not. As we have seen, such channels arise naturally in experimental
situations.
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